The 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is perhaps the central figure in modern philosophy. Although like other philosophers—perhaps most famously Plato—the value he places on rationality as an essential capacity of human nature might suggest his endorsement of attempts to shape human nature through eugenic interventions, there is, in fact, much in Kant’s writings to support anti-eugenic thought.

Introducing Kant
Kant is best known for his formal work in both metaphysics and moral philosophy. Kant is less well-known for his work in anthropology, and perhaps even less so for his pioneering work in the science of generation and heredity. Kant’s interest in the sciences in general, and in anthropology in particular, is in part motivated by his conviction that the ultimate goal for philosophic and scientific inquiry concerns human utility and human dignity. Following Francis Bacon’s (1561-1626) scientific method, Kant thinks that the task of modern science is to interrogate nature so that we can gain instrumental control over it. He argues that we are to use our knowledge of and power over nature for achieving the moral betterment of the human species. Given that he thinks mental illness and severe cognitive impairment, for example, present significant barriers for achieving our moral goal, one might expect to find Kant advocating for genetic engineering if it could help in removing such obstacles. While he predates eugenics as we now understand it, Kant, in fact, claims that attempts to determine in advance what sorts of people there should be by way of artificial engineering would be contrary to the ends of nature itself.

Determining what sorts of people there should be
Martin Gunderson (2007) has recently argued that germ-line engineering that can enhance ‘talents or capacities that enable one to pursue morally justifiable goals is permissible’ on Kantian grounds (Gunderson 92). Germ-line engineering modifies germ cells by introducing functional genes into their genomes. This procedure causes all of the original cells in an organism to contain the modified gene, which means that such modifications become hereditary. Gunderson’s idea is that if ‘germ-line engineering could eliminate … mental illness or even ameliorate it, this would be a great boon for humanity’ (Gunderson 91). While it is true that Kant does think that it is morally permissible to use some medical and scientific advances for the (moral) betterment of humanity, there are at least three reasons why he would view germ-line engineering in particular as morally impermissible.

First, Kant’s theory of human nature is by itself adverse to this kind of genetic engineering that attempts to determine in advance what sorts of people there should be. Second, as the philosopher Jürgen Habermas has argued, germ-line engineering involves the treatment of future generations who have not, and indeed cannot, give their consent for this treatment (Habermas 2003). For Kant, this lack of consent is a moral reason not to pursue germ-line engineering. Third, because the genetic changes made to embryos with germ-line engineering are hereditary and the effects on future generations are both unknown and unpredictable, Kant would no doubt side with current researchers who argue that it is ‘dangerous and ethically unacceptable’ (Lanphier 2015). For present purposes, we shall focus on the first argument just noted, namely Kant’s rejection of genetic engineering.

Kant’s most explicit endorsement of anti-eugenic thought comes by way of an objection to a suggestion proposed by Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertius (1698-1759), a forerunner in the study of heredity in biology. Maupertius’ idea was that through selectively breeding people with the desired, so-called nobler qualities with those of similar stock, humankind could eliminate the degenerative, undesired qualities from the human species. Against Maupertius, Kant argues that, while such a program is in itself feasible, it goes against Nature’s own ends. Kant’s claim is that it is precisely through such diversity and ‘the intermingling of the evil with the good’ that Nature develops the human race, leading it ‘nearer to the perfection of [its moral] destiny’ (Kant 2007, 86-7).

Kant on human nature
To better understand Kant’s suggestion that genetic engineering would be contrary to the aims of Nature it will be instructive to briefly consider his theory of human nature. Kant conceives of human nature teleologically. What this means for Kant is that the human being is in some sense designed to serve a purpose or function. One way in which he describes human nature is in terms of what he calls “natural predispositions” or “natural capacities,” the most fundamental of which are the predispositions to rationality and morality (Kant 2007, 417). It is important that these natural predispositions are understood in the sense of potentialities. As Kant puts it, the human being is an animal that has the capacity for rationality, but the development of rationality in individuals as well as the species is contingent upon a variety of circumstances and it can fail to develop in some cases (Kant 2007, 417). For example, a child born with a severe cognitive impairment might be inhibited from fully developing into a rational and moral agent.

Mixing the good with the bad
It might seem odd to claim that Nature mixes the good with the bad in order to promote the development of the human species. After all, if Nature’s aim really is to lead humankind towards moral perfection, it would seem that severe mental illness and/or cognitive disability are precisely the sorts of things that we should want to eradicate where possible. But, on Kant’s view, this is one kind of conflict that drives the (moral) development of the species itself. And it is this idea that leads him to reject genetic engineering, because interfering with Nature that way would effectively remove the very conditions he thinks drive the development and progress of the species in the first place.

One way in which human diversity and the need to overcome all kinds of adversity help our moral development is precisely because these facts of the human condition force us to confront difficult moral questions about how we ought to regard people who are different from and/or less able than others. Raising and appropriately responding to these sorts of conflict, among others, brings us closer to living up to the (Kantian) moral ideal that the rights and dignity of all human beings ought to be protected from individual and state transgressions.

This of course does not mean that Kant prohibits the treatment of mental illness full-stop, but he does think that it means that we need to think more carefully about the sorts of treatments we do employ. Germ-line engineering that attempts to alter Nature and determine in advance what sorts of people there should be is not an approach that would garner the Kantian seal of approval.

-Alan McLuckie

• Bacon, F. (2000). The New Organon. New York: Cambridge University Press.

• Gunderson, M. (2007). “Seeking Perfection: A Kantian Look at Human Genetic Engineering,” in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 28, 87-102.

• Habermas, J. (2003). The Future of Human Nature. Trans. W. Rehg, M. Pensky, and H. Beister. Cambridge: Polity Press.

• Kant, I. (2007). Anthropology, History, and Education. Trans. M. Gregor, P. Guyer, R. Louden, H. Wilson, A. Wood, G. Zöller, and A Zweig. New York: Cambridge University Press.

• Lanphier, E. et al. (2015). “Don’t Edit the Human Germ Line,” in Nature News. Nature Publishing Group, from http://www.nature.com/news/don-t-edit-the-human-germ-line-1.17111 (accessed May 15, 2015).

• Maupertius, P. Système de la nature, in Oeuvres, vol. II. (1756). Lyons.

• Potts, R. Humanity’s Descent: the Consequences of Ecological Instability. (1996). New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1996.Bashford, A., Levine, P. (Eds.).